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Abstract
This research hopes to answer a few questions. Do macroeconomic variables, specifically
unemployment, government debt, and growth levels drive Spain’s SDRP? Of what magnitude is that
influence? What impact did the Great Recession have on the variables’ magnitude of influence? This
research will use time series analysis to answer these questions.
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An Analysis of Spain’s Sovereign Debt Risk
Premium
Timothy Mackey

I.

Introduction
Since the Great Recession hit the
United States, and the rest of the world, in
2008 and 2009, recovery has been slow. Spain
in particular has had a hard time adjusting to
the unstable economy, earning them a bailout
of nearly €37 billion in November 2012. Four
of its weakest banks are to be completely
restructured, hoping to cut their balance sheets
by over 60% by 2017. As the country stands
now, unemployment is at 27% and it is said to
be going through its second recession in three
years (Thompson, 2012). Though it’s too early
to analyze the effects of the bailout, analyzing
Spain’s economy can still help answer
important questions about the recession
as well as Spain’s future. It is important to
analyze larger and influential countries in the
European Union, like Spain, as they can often
help explain the greater effects on the world
economy as a whole.
Five years after the recession and
following an EU bailout, one wonders if
Spain’s debt is a safe investment or one that
carries more risk. One way to measure this is
the Sovereign Debt Risk Premium, or SDRP.
A Risk Premium is the expected return on
an investment based on the level of risk
that it carries, meaning that the Sovereign
Debt Risk Premium is the expected return
on investing in Spain’s Sovereign Debt. The
higher the risk, the higher the yield needs
to be in order to attract investment. To find
Spain’s SDRP, Spain will be compared to

an economically stable country, in this case,
Germany. Germany is the third largest
economy in the world and is often used as the
“control” variable in economic tests of EU
countries’ well-being. An example is Iglesias
et al. (2003) which, similar to this study, uses
Germany as a control when testing Spain’s
economic indicators. Since October 2011
Germany’s interest rate has not been higher
than 2%, while Spain’s has been as high as
6.8%. To put those numbers into perspective,
the United States’ interest rate has been about
1% since 2011. Germany’s unemployment
rate is currently at 7% (about the same as the
United States), while Spain’s is at a staggering
27%. Currently, Spain is still struggling with
an interest rate of 4.5% (as of August 2013);
while simultaneously Germany’s interest rate
is 1.7%. Because Germany and Spain are both
part of the European Union and have such
polar economic standings, juxtaposing the
two will yield the best results. To find Spain’s
SDRP the yield of the German government
debt is subtracted from the yield of the
Spanish government debt.
This research hopes to answer a few
questions. Do macroeconomic variables,
specifically unemployment, government
debt, and growth levels drive Spain’s SDRP?
Of what magnitude is that influence? What
impact did the Great Recession have on
the variables’ magnitude of influence? This
research will use time series analysis to answer
these questions.

The Park Place Economist, Volume XXII

67

Mackey
The rest of the paper is organized
as follows: the next section is a literature
review which discusses others’ contributions
to this study and how this study intends to
build on them, followed by the description of
the data and methods that are used, the last
two sections are the results of the regression
equation and the presentation of the
conclusions. Tables and Figures can be found
in the Appendix at the end of the paper.
II.

Literature Review
This analysis will reveal whether or not
the interest rate on Spanish debt is a function
of unemployment, real GDP growth rates,
and government debt and how much influence
those variables have. Similarly Jimenez-Martin
et al. (2010) show how risk premiums affect
exchange rates. The study finds that returns
on exchange rates are a function of volatility
of economic indicators and the perception
by state-uncertainty. Groba et al. (2013) find
that both the risk premium and the default
components of credit default swap spreads are
partially explained by macroeconomic factors.
Similarly, Schuknecht et al. (2009) analyze
the bond spreads issued by 13 European
countries. The sample period was from 1991
to early 2005. They find that yield spreads
over bonds depends significantly on indicators
of fiscal performance. These studies show how
economic variables affect other kinds of risk
premiums. This study focusses specifically on
the sovereign debt risk premium which should
be similarly affected by macroeconomic
indicators. These studies show that risk
premiums can generally be explained by global
and local macroeconomic factors, this study
builds on them by attempting to find how
significant specific economic factors are to the
SDRP.
The data used juxtaposes Germany
and Spain before and after the financial crisis
because of Germany’s relative economic
stability. Other literature on risk premiums
finds that since the economic crisis at the end
68

of the last decade Germany has become an
economic “safe haven” Bernoth et al. (2012).
It is reasonable that juxtaposing Spain’s
interest rate and other variables to Germany’s
will yield more informative results about
Spain’s stability. The research of Bernoth et al.
(2012) finds that after the financial crisis, bond
yield spreads can still be largely explained on
the basis of economic principles. Similarly,
this paper will show the magnitude of effect
the aforementioned variables have on Spain’s
risk premium.
Bernoth et al. (2012) also find that
German government bond yields are still
below other government bond yields with
better debt positions. They inferred that that
bond yields do not appropriately reflect fiscal
performance, which is contrary to popular
belief. Schuknecht et al. (2009) state that
because risk premiums have always been
positively related to debt and deficits, that
government bond yields are “signals of the
markets’ assessment of the sustainability of
fiscal policy”. A different study by Akemann
et al. (2005) show that interest rates are
inversely related to debt sustainability which
is more relevant to this paper considering
Spanish debt’s high risk premium of late.
The study shows that an increasing interest
rate will eventually lead to a decrease in the
demand for government bonds which often
leads to default. This shows the importance of
interest rates and risk premiums as economic
indicators despite the findings of Bernoth et
al. (2012) regarding the ability of bond yields
to appropriately reflect fiscal performance.
Iglesias et al. (2003) analyzes the
evolution of the French, German, and Spanish
risk premium using a multivariate GARCH-M
model of the three countries. Using monthly
data gathered from Datastream database
and the bank of Spain, they found the excess
holding yields on the 3-month short-term
interest rate relative to the 1-month shortterm interest rate in each country. They fit
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a GARCH-M model to the series and using
it the study finds that Spain’s risk premium
was time-varying and was dependent on
the volatility of the German yield. So the
evolution of the Spanish interest rate before
entering the EMU has been more influenced
by uncertainty in the German economy than
in the Spanish economy. This paper will use
more current data (from immediately after this
study) to show how Spain’s own economic
indicators affect its interest rate and risk
premium. It will show how Spain’s economy
has evolved to the point where its interest rates
rely less on Germany’s volatility and more on
Spanish economic indicators.
II. Data and Methods
This section describes the data,
methods, and transformations used to analyze
the SDRP. Four data series were used: Risk
Premium (the difference between Spain’s
and Germany’s yield of government-issued
bonds), Growth Gap (the difference between
Spain’s and Germany’s GDP growth rates),
Unemployment Differential (the difference
between the growth rates of the unemployed
population in Spain and Germany), Debt
Differential (the difference between the
growth rates of government debt in Spain and
Germany). A dummy variable was also used
to capture the change in market assessment
of sovereign debt risk after the 2008 financial
crisis. Called “Dummy_2008”, it has a value
of 0 before 2008 and 1 afterward. These
data were gathered from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) database and the
Eurostat database. The data sets are comprised
of quarterly data from quarter 1 of 1999 to
quarter 2 of 2013. Some data existed for all
of 1999 and quarter 2 of 2013, but it was
not complete across all variables. The IMF
is an international organization made up
of 188 countries whose goal is worldwide
economic prosperity. Their online database
is based on worldwide economic surveillance
overseen by the member countries. Similarly
Eurostat is a Directorate-General of the

European Commission (the executive body
of the European Union). Eurostat’s database
provides statistical information to the EU
in an effort to promote the harmonization
of statistical methods across its member
countries. This analysis would have benefitted
from more frequent data, but only quarterly
data was consistently available across all of
the variables.
From the IMF the following data for
Spain and Germany was gathered: interest
rates on government bonds in percents,
unemployment and labor force in number
of people, and real gross domestic product
in euros (adjusted for 2005 euro prices and
seasonally adjusted). From Eurostat the two
governments’ consolidated gross debt in euros
based on current market prices were gathered.
After gathering the data, it was transformed
into the four datasets: Risk Premium, Growth
Gap, Unemployment Differential, and Debt
Differential.
To find the Risk Premium, German
bond interest rates were subtracted from
Spanish bond interest rates. To find the
Growth Gap the GDP growth rates were first
found by taking the first order differences of
the logarithms of the countries’ respective
GDPs. The German GDP growth rates
were then subtracted from the Spanish GDP
growth rates to find the Growth Gap. The
Unemployment Differential was found by
first taking the first order differences of the
logarithms of each counties’ unemployed
population and then subtracting Germany’s
from Spain’s. Similarly the Debt Differential
was found by first taking the first order
differences of the logarithms of each counties’
consolidated gross debt and then subtracting
Germany’s from Spain’s.
The Sovereign Debt Risk Premium
is the center of this analysis because it is
an oft-used economic indicator. Akemann
(2005), for example, finds that the SDRP
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is inversely related to a country’s ability to
avoid default. SDRPs are often influenced
by general macroeconomic factors like GDP
growth, government debt, and unemployment.
In fact, Groba (2013) finds that risk premiums
are directly influenced by macroeconomic
factors. Testing these specific variables against
Spain’s SDRP shows the magnitude of their
influence. It is hypothesized that the Debt and
Unemployment Differentials are positively
related to the Risk Premium, as increases in
all three variables tend to be associated with
a worsening economic situation. It is also
projected that the Risk Premium is positively
related to the Growth Gap because a widening
GDP growth gap implies general economic
instability.
Figure 1 is a graph, in levels, showing
Spain’s SDRP over time. The data reveals
three trends: the SDRP is stagnant from
2000Q1 to 2008Q1, generally increasing from
2008Q1 to 2012Q3, and decreasing from
2012Q3 to 2013Q1. This accurately portrays
Spain’s periods of economic stability (before
the 2008 financial crisis), instability (during
the crisis), and recovery (after the bailout in
November 2012) over the last 13 years. Figure
1 indicates that the SDRP peaked in 2012Q3
immediately before the bailout and after the
bailout it shows a sharp decline in the SDRP
that mirrors the increase from years previous.

From this it can be inferred that the bailout
of nearly €37 billion in November 2012
has already started to positively affect the
economic stability of Spain. Figure 2 shows
all of the datasets. The Unemployment Gap
shows a general downward trend until around
2006 when it begins to increase. It stays below
5%, but after a sharp increase in 2008, due
to the recession, it goes past 10% and in the
years following it continues to increase. The
November 2012 bailout doesn’t seem to show
70

any effect on the unemployment gap as of yet,
but employment is bound to remain stagnant
for longer than financial indicators. The
Growth Gap shows some seasonal trends, but
stays around 0.005% until dropping to around
0% in 2006. It, too, spikes during the recession
before finding a new normal at -0.01% in
2009. Spain and Germany had similar levels
of growth until the recession where the
numbers had an anomalous spike before
showing the new normal where Spain’s growth
level is consistently lower than Germany’s.
The Debt Differential, similar to the Growth
Gap, has seasonal trends that hover around
0% to -0.01% before the 2008 recession spike
to almost .08%. The Debt Differential then
dips down to -0.06% in 2011, spikes the next
quarter and continues in this fashion. After the
recession the data becomes highly irregular,
with many spikes and dips, never reaching a
new normal. It can be inferred from this that
the German debt was immediately affected
by the recession and the Spanish debt took a
few years to feel the same effects. There is a
direct correlation between the Unemployment
Differential and the Risk Premium, while
the Debt Differential and the Growth Gap
share only a simultaneous spike with the Risk
Premium during the 2008 recession.
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimation
was used with Eviews software to fit a model
to the data in the following form:

III.

Results
The first step to fitting a model to these
series is finding their order of integration. The
tables in the appendix show the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots and the
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin tests
for stationarity. These datasets were tested
for stationary motion, or “stationarity”, in
their mean and variance. Stationarity, or
lack of stationarity, can strongly influence
the behavior and properties of a series, and
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without it, the estimated model cannot be
accepted as an accurate portrayal of the data.
If a series contains a unit root then it will
be non-stationary and will then need to be
adjusted, most economic and financial series
contain a single unit root. For the Augmented
Dickey Fuller test, the test statistic and the
critical values are compared to accept or reject
the null hypothesis that the sets have a unit
root. If the t-stat is greater than the critical
values at the 5% level, then it can be assumed
with at least a 95% degree of confidence that
there is a unit root.
Table 1 shows the ADF test for the
Risk Premium series. The test statistic for
levels is -0.1027, while the 5% critical value
is -2.9135. The test-statistic is greater than
the critical value at a 5% confidence interval,
which means that the null hypothesis is
not rejected with at least a 95% degree of
confidence. The dataset has a unit root in
levels, which means that the dataset must
be differentiated (using the formula d(Risk_
Premium) in Eviews) to induce stationarity in
the datasets. Table 1 also shows the ADF tests
for the other datasets. The Unemployment
Differential dataset also contains a unit root,
while the other datasets do not.
Looking at the first order differences
(FOD) of the Risk Premium dataset in Table
2, the t-stat is -5.5532 while the critical value
at 5% is -2.9145. In this case the t-stat is
less than the critical value and thus the null
hypothesis is rejected. The FOD of the SDRP
dataset does not have a unit root. The FOD of
the other variables was taken and then tested
for unit roots as well. The ADF test was used
again on the other three datasets and finds in
Table 2 that the t-stats are less than the 5%
critical values. The datasets do not have unit
roots after taking their first order differences.
These tests suggest that the datasets are
now stationary. Another test to ensure this
assumption is correct is the KwiatkowskiPhillips-Schmidt-Shin test for stationarity.

For this test the critical values are
compared to the test statistic. If the t-stat is
greater than the critical value at the 5% level,
then the null hypothesis is rejected. The null
hypothesis in this case is that the datasets
exhibit stationarity. Table 3 shows the KPSS
tests for stationarity in the FOD of the four
datasets. In all four cases the t-stats fall outside
of the 10% confidence interval. The t-stats
are very small, which means that that, with
absolute certainty, the null hypothesis is not
rejected. The datasets exhibit stationarity in
first order differences.
To summarize, both the ADF test for
unit roots and the KPSS test for stationarity
suggest that the datasets are not stationary
in levels, but are stationary in first order
differences.
Using Eviews to estimate a regression resulted
in the coefficients in Figure 3.0. After looking
at multiple lags for the Debt Differential,
a two-quarter lag showed the greatest
explanatory power. The hypothesis that the
Debt and Unemployment Differentials and
the Growth Gap would be positively related
to the Risk Premium was correct. This
reinforces the idea that increases in debt and
unemployment will increase Spain’s SDRP
and that a widening GDP growth gap will do
the same. The sign, magnitude, and statistical
significance of each variable, is then analyzed
individually. The Debt Differential has a lag
of 2 quarters, whereas the others have none.
This lag is used to better capture the dynamics
of the dataset. After trying out several other
lags, a lag of two quarters explained the most
about the dependent variable. Its coefficient
is 4.1445 indicating that a 1% increase in the
Debt Differential will result in a 4.1445%
increase in the SDRP after two quarters.
The p-stat shows the probability that the
coefficient is statistically equal to 0. For this
variable it is 0.00980 which means that it is
99% certain that the coefficient is not equal to
zero. The Growth Gap’s coefficient is 7.6101

The Park Place Economist, Volume XXII

71

Mackey
indicating that a 1% widening of the Growth
Gap will result in a 7.6101% increase in the
SDRP. For this variable the p-stat is 0.0980
which means that it is only about 90% certain
that the coefficient is not equal to zero. The
Unemployment Differential’s coefficient is
0.2843 indicating that a 1% increase in the
Unemployment Differential will result in a
0.28% increase in the SDRP. For this variable
the p-stat is 0.3875 which means that with no
certainty is the coefficient not equal to zero.
The Dummy Variable’s coefficient is 0.1653
indicating that the recession caused a 16%
increase in the SDRP. For this variable the
p-stat is 0.0605 which means that, with almost
95% certainty, the coefficient is not equal to
zero. The f-test tests the hypothesis that all of
the coefficients are equal to 0. The f-statistics
can be seen at the bottom of Figure 3.0. The
f-stat is 3.7216 which is greater than 2 and the
null hypothesis that the all of the coefficients
are statistically equal to 0 is thus rejected. This
is accomplished with at least 95% certainty
because the p-value of the f-stat is 0.0108.
The adjusted R-squared value is 0.1849 which
means that the regression can explain 18.49%
of the data.
This model was subjected to diagnostic
checking, to ensure the regression is valid.
For the purposes of this paper, three different
diagnostic checks were used: White’s test
for homoscedasticity, the Breusch-Godfrey
test for autocorrelation, and the JarqueBera test for normality of distribution. The
desired results for these tests would be to have
regression residuals that are homoscedastic,
not autocorrelated, and normally distributed.
Diagnostic checking tests the reliability of the
estimated parameters.
Table 4.0 shows a condensed version
of the results of the tests. For all of the tests,
if their p-values are greater than .05 then it is
certain to at least a degree of 95% confidence
that the null hypothesis is not rejected. For
White’s test for homoscedacity the p-value
is 0.5065, which is greater than .05, so
72

the null hypothesis that the residuals are
homoscedastic fails to be rejected. For BreushGodfrey’s test for autocorrelation the p-value
is .5237, which is greater than .05, so the null
hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation
fails to be rejected. For the Jarque-Bera test
for normality of distribution the p-value is
.000000, which is much less than .05. This
means that the null hypothesis that the
residuals are normally distributed is rejected.
All but one of the tests had the desired results
for reliable parameters except for the JarqueBera test for normality of distribution. The
Jarque-Bera test in Figure 3.3 shows that the
distribution is relatively normal and that it is
nearly certain that the estimated parameters
were reliable and gave an acceptable
R-Squared value despite the Jarque-Bera test
results.
IV.

Conclusion
Since the 2008 recession, Spain’s
economy has been struggling; so much so, that
the EU agreed to give the country a €37 billion
bailout in November 2012. The risk premium
on Spanish debt is an economic indicator
of that struggle. As Spain approaches
economic collapse the risk premium increases
portraying the risk of the investment in its
debt. Spain’s interest rate was compared to
that of Germany’s to find the risk premium
because Germany has a more stable economy.
To see which variables affect the SDRP a
time series analysis was applied to certain
economic indicators’ effect on the SDRP.
The following data for Spain and Germany
was gathered from the IMF and Eurostat
databases: interest rates on government bonds,
the unemployment level, labor forces, real
GDPs, and government debts. That data was
transformed into the Risk Premium, Growth
Gap, Unemployment Differential, and Debt
Differential of the two countries. With the
data properly transformed the process of
estimating a model began. Using ADF and
KPSS tests, the datasets were tested for
stationarity, with the result that the data is

The Park Place Economist, Volume XXII

Mackey
stationary in FOD. With the stationary data, a
model was estimated and diagnostic checking
found that the model was homoscedastic, not
autocorrelated, and normally distributed.
The Unemployment Differential
had a large p-stat indicating the coefficient’s
lack of significance. This implies that the
Spanish labor market does not have a
strong relationship to its financial market.
The Growth Gap had a p-value too high
to consider its coefficient significant, but
low enough that assumptions about the
Growth Gap’s effect on the SDRP would be
inconclusive. The Dummy Variable showed
the positive effect the 2008 recession had
on Spain’s SDRP, increasing it by 16%. The
Debt Differential’s coefficient was statistically
significant and showed that as the differential
increases, the SDRP increases by 4.1445 times
more (after a two quarter lag).
These findings imply that the Debt
Differential drives the SDRP and that the
Unemployment Differential does not. The
2008 recession increased Spain’s SDRP,
thereby showing the economic indicating
power of the SDRP. The findings in this
paper build on the findings of Schkneckt et al.
(2009) and Groba et al. (2013) and Bernoth
et al. (2012) that macroeconomic indicators
have an effect on interest rates by showing the
magnitude of influence the Debt Differential
has on SDRP. Possible flaws in this study
include the lack of frequency in the data used
and the few variables that were tested. More
frequent data would increase the significance
of these findings and more variables would
have been more informative as to the effects of
macroeconomic indicators on SDRP.
Possible implications of this study
include the Spanish government’s ability
to better focus recovery efforts on its debt,
knowing now that the Debt Differential has
a great effect on its SDRP. The European
Central Bank, now knowing about the lag

in the Debt Differential, can anticipate that
lag when giving out bailouts to countries
like Spain. Should Spanish government
face another recession or other economic
difficulties, decreasing its debt can help
to lower its SDRP. The negative effects a
recession can have on a country’s economy
are evident in this analysis. The Spanish
government now knows that once they enter a
recession, their SDRP will increase and they
should account for that increase. This study
could be extended further with the inclusion
of more macroeconomic indicators to find
their magnitudes, doing a similar analysis
without Germany to see if those results
have a higher r-squared, and doing the same
analysis in a few years to see the effect of the
November 2012 bailout on Spain’s SDRP.
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Appendix

ADF Tests
Table 1
H0: Series has unit
root
Variables in levels
Risk Premium
Debt Differential
Growth Gap
Unemployment
Differential
1% Critical Value
5% Critical Value
10% Critical Value

Table 3
H0: Series is
stationary
Variables in FOD
of levels
Risk Premium
Debt Differential
Growth Gap
Unemployment
Differential
1% Critical Value
5% Critical Value
10% Critical Value

Constant
-0.1027
-4.1589
-5.0391
-2.1509
-3.5504
-2.9135
-2.5845

Constant
0.2212
0.1777
0.0573
0.1480
0.7390
0.4630
0.3470

Table 2
H0: Series has unit
root
Variables in FOD
of levels
Risk Premium
Debt Differential
Growth Gap
Unemployment
Differential
1% Critical Value
5% Critical Value
10% Critical Value

Table 4
Variable
Constant
Debt Differential
(t-2)
Growth Gap
Unemployment
Differential
Dummy Variable
Adjusted RSquared
F-Statistic
Sample Size
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Constant
-5.5532
-11.8101
-9.5355
-10.4788
-3.5504
-2.9135
-2.5845

Coefficient
-0.0004
(-0.0077)
4.1445**
(2.7211)
7.6101
(1.6903)
0.2844
(0.8727)
0.1653*
(1.9265)
0.1849
3.7216
49

75

Mackey

Table 5
Test
White
Statistic
BreuschGodfrey
Statistic
Jarque-Bera
Statistic

Value
0.9603

P-Value
0.5065

0.6569

0.5237

39.7081

0.0000

Figure 1
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Figure 2

Figure 3
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